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Abstract 
 
In order to examine the functioning of regional innovation systems, it is necessary to look 
at the building blocks of these systems, technology-based clusters.  There is a strong 
biotechnology cluster in Vancouver - eighty-eight firms, according to BC Biotech (2002) 
-  yet there is no major manufacturing facility. The Vancouver cluster is unlike other 
biotech clusters in that its output is solely intellectual property.  This ongoing study not 
only examines the usual structure of a cluster (sources of innovation, barriers to 
innovation) but also will focus on the issue of intellectual environment, and seek to 
determine whether a strong cluster can be built without the presence of a large, globally-
competitive, manufacturer.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ability to innovate is one of the most powerful sources of competitive advantage in 
modern economies. The ability to acquire, adapt and advance knowledge determines how 
well businesses and countries innovate and, in turn, how well they compete locally and 
globally.  Knowledge is a unique commodity in that while it can be created, it cannot be 
destroyed. It can be transferred, but the source retains all of the knowledge it transfers to 
the recipient.  Knowledge can flow from one institution to another, either through 
transfers of people, or through financial transactions that permit the acquisition of 
knowledge.  
 
Technology-based clusters are emerging in regions that have achieved critical mass in the 
knowledge economy. These clusters are anchored by strong research universities, 
industrial laboratories and entrepreneurial companies, with human capital and 
infrastructure to match.  Collectively these clusters form regional and national systems of 
innovation.  This paper will apply experience in looking at a specific cluster 
(biotechnology) within a regional system of innovation in a federation to looking at how 
a cluster in one regional system of innovation may differ from a similar cluster in other 
regions. 
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The literature on national innovation systems (NIS) is quite recent. The first author to 
introduce the concept was Christopher Freeman in a case study of Japan, in 1987. 
Lundvall (1992) developed the concept from a more theoretical and conceptual point of 
view, using Denmark as an example. Since then the systems of innovation approach has 
shifting from solely a national perspective to one including regional or local systems.  
Are NIS unique systems, or are they simply agglomerations of RIS? Is an NIS greater 
than the sum of its component RIS?  This focus on spatial aspects has two major 
advantages; on the one hand, it recognizes that innovation is a social process and is 
shaped by persons and institutions that share a common language, rules, norms and 
culture (i.e. common modes of communication). On the other hand, innovation is also a 
geographic process, taking into account that technological capabilities are grounded on 
regional communities that share a common knowledge base. 
 
For federations, the national system of innovation is more complex than that of a 
centrally-administered nation, since there are often provincial/state level institutions and 
actors that parallel national level institutions and actors, with some policies or powers 
under provincial control, and others under federal control. Canada is one of the few true 
economic and social (as well as political) federations in the world. In the OECD, only 
Australia, the US and Germany come close to the unique structure and socio-economic 
features that exist in Canada. Thus, unlike most nations in the OECD, and other parts of 
the industrialized world, the Canadian national system of innovation is different.  A key 
element of the Canadian federation is the allocation of most economic powers to the 
national government and the assignment of social responsibilities  - particularly health 
and education – to the provinces. 
 
Holbrook and Wolfe (2000) have argued that, at least in the case of Canada, in order to 
understand the NIS, one must first understand the RIS.  Is the Canadian NIS the sum of a 
number of RIS, whether based on economic regions or provincial boundaries?  In the 
Canadian context this summation is distorted by the wide variation in sizes of the 
regional systems – national level data (and the ensuing analyses) of the Canadian system 
of innovation are heavily biased by the economic activities occurring in the two major 
industrialized provinces, Ontario and Quebec.  In most developed nations innovation, 
science and technology policies are formulated by the central government, yet most 
innovation activities take place locally. Thus nation-wide innovation policies may not 
affect each region equally, and could conceivably be counterproductive in some 
instances.  
 
The recently published OECD territorial review on Canada recommends a new regional 
policy approach, taking into account that Canada is becoming less a resource-based 
economy requiring the: 
 
“valorization of potential competitive advantages with regard to industrial production 
and services, and the removal of bottlenecks (weak cluster integration, valorization of 
natural resources, etc.) preventing further development. Given their often local and 
regional nature, this strategy should result in attaching a more important role to the 
territorial policies” (OECD, 2002). 
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Turning to empirical studies regarding RIS, there are many case studies from the 
perspective of economic geography. In particular, there are studies that establish different 
typologies of RIS and clusters, with the intention to make explicit the differences that 
may be found within a country, and the complexities of the study of RIS and clusters. 
Longhi (1998) has argued that there are preconditions for the development of a regional 
system of innovation which include: a) a coherent set of territorial relationships among 
all economic actors, b) a specific culture, and c) a shared representation system, implying 
a strong consensus and integration among them. 
 
 
A useful model was developed by Cooke (1998) who established two key dimensions to 
analyze RIS: the S&T (research) governance infrastructure and business innovation 
superstructure. The governance infrastructure dimension – initially developed for 
technology transfer purposes- establishes three main types of RIS: grassroots, network 
and dirigiste. It is clear that governance structure for Cooke it is not political governance 
as it is normally/usually understood. The initiation of the RIS is the key feature, which 
then affects funding, the type of research (applied, basic, near to the market, etc.), 
technology specialization and the forms and degrees of coordination. Grassroots are 
locally organized, network RIS are multilevel organized and dirigiste are the product of 
central government policies. The business innovation dimension gives us the posture of 
the firms in the regional economy, both towards each other and the outside world, as well 
as in relations with producers as with consumers in the market place. Firms can range 
from those with local influence to multinationals.  
 
Cooke establishes two key dimensions to analyze RIS: the governance infrastructure and 
business innovation superstructure. Cooke uses the governance infrastructure dimension 
to classify modes of technology transfer. The business innovation dimension gives the 
posture of the firms in the regional economy, both towards each other and the outside 
world, as well as in relations with producers as with consumers in the market place. 
 
Table 1:  SOME EXAMPLES OF REGIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS1 
 
Governance structure/ 
Business innovation 
dimension 
 
Grassroots 
 
Network Dirigiste 
Localist Tuscany (northern 
Italian industrial 
districts)  
Tampere 
(Denmark) 
Tohoku 
(Japan) 
Interactive Catalonia 
Saskatchewan 
Manitoba 
Baden-Wurtemberg 
British Columbia 
Alberta 
Québec 
Globalized Ontario 
California 
North Rhine–
Westphalia 
Singapore 
Midi-Pyrenées 
Source: Cooke, 1998, regions in italics are added by the author 
                                                
1 These cases are studied in Braczyk, Cooke and Heidenreich (1998).  
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Going a step forward, one needs to distinguish between an RIS and an industrial cluster 
of the type defined by Porter, among others. How much innovation and what type of 
innovation should exist in a cluster for it to be considered a viable element of an RIS? 
Several possibilities exist: 
 
• Clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field (Porter, 1998). 
 
• A cluster is a geographically bounded concentrations of interdependent businesses 
(Rosenfeld, 1997, cited by Asheim and Isaksen, 2001) 
 
• Clusters are regarded as places where close inter-firm communication, and social-
cultural structures and institutional environment may stimulate socially and 
territorially embedded collective learning and continuous innovation (Asheim and 
Isaksen, 2001). 
 
 
The British Columbia Biotech Cluster Study 
 
There are a number of biotech clusters in Canada, seven of which are being studied by 
the ISRN project.  The long-term objective is to compare these clusters within the NIS 
and seek out regional differences that can provide useful information about the RIS.  For 
the purposes of this study, we started with a definition of a cluster based on Porter’s 
model, but modified as described in the overall ISRN program description2. 
 
Wolfe and Gertler (2003) have proposed the existence of at least two types of industrial 
cluster in Canada Type I, “regionally embedded and anchored”, and type II “entrepôt”. In 
a type I cluster, “the local knowledge/science base represents a major generator of new, 
unique knowledge assets”. In a type II cluster “much of the knowledge required for 
innovation and production is simply acquired through straightforward market 
transactions.  Table 2 shows the clusters and a first approximation as to their typology.  In 
the cases of the three smaller clusters, it is difficult to determine typology.  They are 
shown here as “undifferentiated”. It may well be that at some point they will grow to a 
point that they become either a type I or a type II cluster.  Less likely, but still a 
possibility, is that type II clusters eventually grow to be type I . The ISRN research 
should help to determine this. 
                                                
2 Two key differences are a) the cluster does not have to be globally competitive, but nationally 
competitive, and b) public sector institutions can (and do) play major roles in the formation and 
sustainability of the cluster.  
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Table 2:  Typology of Biotech Clusters in Canada 
 
Cluster Type Size (in stars”)* Geographic 
boundaries 
Economic 
boundaries 
Montreal I 70 ++ ++ 
Toronto I 47 - ++ 
Vancouver I 80 ++ ++ 
Saskatoon II 22 Wide area + 
Ottawa undifferentiated 6 + + 
London  undifferentiated 5 - - - 
Halifax undifferentiated n/a ++ + 
* see Queenton and Niosi (2003) 
 
Not all of these studies have been completed at this time; this paper highlights the biotech 
cluster in the province of British Columbia.  The definition of “biotechnology” is that 
used by the OECD (see appendix “A”).  It should be noted this definition excludes 
medical devices based on biotechnological processes.  The initial work was based on 
firms and institutions based in Vancouver - in later years the hypothesis that the cluster 
extends to firms on Vancouver Island will be tested, and it is not clear that this can be 
taken for granted.  For practical reasons, as well as for the geographic concentration 
usually associated with industrial clusters, this study does not extend to other parts of 
British Columbia. 
 
The institutions and enterprises making up the cluster for our study are taken from a 
“snapshot’ taken in early 2002 based on information from the National Research Council 
(NRC) and BC Biotech.3  There are approximately forty privately owned firms, ten 
venture capitalists, nine government organization, two non-profit organizations, and three 
research institutes.  Thirty-two private firms belong to the pharmaceutical cluster and 
eight to the medical device cluster.  This number is constantly changing: BC Biotech 
(2002) has stated there are 91 biotech firms in BC in 2002 with 88 of them being in the 
Vancouver/Lower Vancouver Island area.  
 
 
The Biotech “Vibe” in Vancouver 
 
 
Biotech research institutes in Vancouver are, understandably, located near the three main 
post-secondary institutions:  University of British Columbia (UBC), Simon Fraser 
University (SFU), and the British Columbia Institute of Technology.  Government 
agencies are located on or near the UBC campus. 
 
                                                
3 BC Biotech (2003) stated there are eighty-eight firms in Vancouver and the southern part of Vancouver 
Island 
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The private component of the biotech sector in Vancouver consists of young and small 
firms.  The oldest (and “model”) is Quadra Logic Technology (QLT) founded in 1981, 
which is the largest privately owned biotech firm in Vancouver.  Since 1995, 19 biotech 
firms have been spun off from UBC, and 7 from SFU; of these 26, 19 or 73% are still in 
existence.  Figure 1 shows the growth of the BC biotech cluster start-up firms by year of 
start-up and stage of development. 
 
The firms are located in five very narrowly defined neighbourhoods – the UBC campus, 
the Vancouver General Hospital, and the Burnaby/New Westminster industrial area.  All 
but one of the venture capitalists are located in the financial district, in downtown 
Vancouver. An interesting observation is that the firms often “trade up” from one lab 
facility to the next, by taking over larger premises and releasing their old space to newer, 
and thus smaller firms. At the same time many of the specialized facilities built to 
incubate biotech companies (often in public institutions, and built with public money) are 
now empty as they are often too expensive for start-up companies. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barriers to Innovation  
 
In discussing barriers to innovation, respondents reported difficulty finding and retaining 
qualified employees.  There is substantial competition with US and Eastern Canada due 
to economic disadvantages in Vancouver - primarily high personal income taxes and 
housing costs – these are somewhat offset by the cultural and climatic conditions of the 
area.  As some respondents noted: 
 
-“Need some kind of incentive to attract employees, something we can work with other 
than scenery - like tax free stock options…” 
-“No incentive to finance biotech in Canada”  
-“Best thing government could do is leave us alone”.  
-“ Let us do business without interfering”  
-“Lack of experienced management, upper level”  
 
BC Biotech - The voice of BC’s Biotechnology Industry 
 
BC Biotech is a non-government, not-for-profit industry driven association.  Representing 
over 90% of BC biotech’s community across all sectors, BC Biotech is an effective voice 
on a range of issues that affect the industry, from influencing public policy to stimulating 
investor interest.  It gives its members access to the information, resources and assistance 
they need to make their ventures a success. BC Biotech keeps its members informed about 
the current state of the biotechnology industry in BC around the world.  Through its 
events, seminars, and educational opportunities, BC Biotech facilitates networking, 
partnering opportunities, and growth for its members and for BC’s biotechnology 
industry. 
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Observers of the biotech cluster (such as government officials) argued the lack of 
industrial experience in Vancouver is due to the relative youth of biotech cluster. The 
lack of highly qualified and experienced management is a problem, not only in 
Vancouver, but across Canada.  Apart from a lack of senior management personnel, there 
is a lack of expertise in the regulatory/drug development area.  Respondents have  
reported the existence of “prowling” head hunters but inter-firm movement by technical 
personnel is relatively low. When asked what could be done to overcome these barriers, 
responses included: 
 
-“Tax breaks! Like Quebec!”. 
- “Tax credits (or tax holidays) for upper level management to be attracted to work here”  
-“Finance – more grants (no pay back)”  
-“Need to increase science coming out of universities.  Not enough commercially minded 
scientists.”  
 
It was argued that it is difficult to attract upper level personnel to Vancouver because of 
its relatively remote location on the North American continent.  There are not enough big 
companies, and potential executives feel that there is not enough scope for mobility 
among biotech enterprises4. Additionally individuals perceive that BC and Canada are 
high-tax locations and that Canadian salaries are not competitive with US salaries: 
however once recruited to Vancouver they are less likely to leave.5  
 
 
Sources of Innovation 
 
Respondents, when asked about sources of innovation noted that there is now a constant 
progression of trained PhD students from UBC labs contributes to talent in BC.   
According to one:  “it’s a trickle down effect better than in ’92”.   Innovation is helped 
by the close proximity of firms to university labs -  “opportunities from UBC, SFU and 
the University of Victoria where tech comes from university and genome centres.” .  The 
biotechnology cluster appears to have grown from knowledge “spillovers” coming out of 
the universities (Goldfarb and Henrekson 2003). 
 
There is strong, friendly and collegiate biotech community in Vancouver, even though 
there are no business relations between these companies.  Many companies affirm that 
they are not “part of network of related firms in the region”, since they each believe they 
work in a specific niche, developing a particular technology/product, whose market is not 
local companies but global pharma companies. It seems that there are two biotech 
                                                
4 As noted by Richard Florida (2000), people often move not for the job that is being offered to them, but 
for the job opportunities presented by moving to the new location. 
5The social benefits conferred by the higher taxes in Canada system, such as health care, and the relative 
advantage in purchasing power of the Canadian dollar erase the perceived differential..  Also from a firm’s 
point of view costs per researcher are lower: R&D expenditures per researcher  (in US$ in 1999, as 
reported by the OECD) are $112,000 per researcher in Canada, $168,000 in France, $148,000 in Germany 
$135,000 in the UK and $160,000 in the US. 
 
 
 9 
specialities in Vancouver, based on the OECD definition and the categories it provides to 
classify the industry: DNA-genomics, and proteins and molecules (especially proteomics, 
and peptides sequencing and synthesis).  There is a strong network of biotech innovators: 
the BC Biotech Association provides networking opportunities for its members:  80% of 
those interviewed mentioned the importance of the BC Biotech Association. 
 
The situation appears to be similar for service companies and contract research 
organizations.  Often they were established originally to support the development of the 
local cluster, but their actual customers are all around the world, especially US 
companies, not Vancouver’s firms. 
 
BC Biotech appears to be the glue that keeps these companies together, and the 
networking events are more for social purposes, to know the community (for 
newcomers), and key for consultants and lawyers for making contacts.  (see Figure 2). 
While BC Biotech is the glue, the driving forces are the research programs at UBC and 
the existence of venture capital and angel investors. Arguably there is little horizontal 
integration, but even less vertical integration, as in the Porter model of clusters. 
 
What anchors firms in Vancouver? Lifestyle, ‘social and historical’ roots in the city? 
A connection to UBC seems to be a common anchor for many of the companies. Many of 
them started at similar times and went through similar challenges—having other 
individuals to interact with who have had similar experiences has created a shared bond 
between some of the firms.  Firms rarely compete with each other for local talent.  They 
are able to attract talent to the city - aided by the weather, scenery and lifestyle of the city 
-  but out-migration of talent does not appear to be a problem.  Firms appear to be 
sufficiently specialized that there is little movement among firms by the technical 
specialists, thus creating a horizontal group of firms, each more or less at the same level 
of relationship to their sources of IP and at the same level of relationship to their other 
inputs (capital, services) and their eventual clients/customers. 
 
As a side experiment we searched websites for the biographies of the senior officers of 
most of the biotech firms in Vancouver.  A majority of the websites listed the degrees, 
and the institutions which awarded them, for their senior people. While this experiment 
was not rigorous, 30 out of 44 sites examined listed the degrees for at least some of their 
key people. 45% of these people had degrees from Canada, with 27% coming from BC.  
About 30% had their highest degree from a US institution. One senior official of a 
biotech firm in Vancouver told us most of their recruiting was done outside BC, and that 
if they could get their senior people to stay in Vancouver for two years, then they had 
little worry of them leaving.  The first two years were critical; this manager emphasized 
the need for some sort of special tax treatment for new hires, particularly those from the 
US, to ease the transition from the US tax system to the Canadian system. 
 
Another important element in BC is the existence of a strong venture capital market; the 
number of angel investors in BC with deep pockets was mentioned by several 
interviewees as being a unique feature of this cluster   Venture capitalists stated: 
 
 10 
- “There are lots of venture capitalists in BC but not enough science”  
 - “The environment of the biotech cluster in Vancouver is similar to that in the mining 
industry in Vancouver when the Vancouver Stock Exchange was still operating.”   
-  “Vancouver is used to high risk with unpredictable outcomes.  There are a lot of angel 
investors because of this dynamic”   
 
An analogy serves to illustrate the cluster:  consider a garden in Vancouver (with the 
backdrop of mountains and sea!).  The soil is the university environment, predominantly 
UBC.   The seeds of ideas germinate in the soil there, watered by funding from the 
federal granting councils.  The plants grow fertilized by funding from venture capitalists.  
There is some cross-pollination from BCBiotech and more water from federal R&D 
support to companies (IRAP funding and R&D tax credits).  Few of the flowers live long 
enough  to mature and go to seed, and generate new plants – most are picked while they 
are still blooming and are carried off by passers-by, large multinational pharma 
companies, who want to have the flowers in their homes6. 
  
 
Observations and Analysis 
 
Over the past decade there has been a stream of new companies being spun off from one 
or other of the research facilities. 1991 was an exception, which possibly coincided with 
the sharp downturn in the stock market.  This trend stopped two years ago – again 
perhaps because of the downturn in the stock market and the parallel decline of dot-com 
companies.  But this may not be the only reason - one respondent said: 
 
“There are a lot of genetic disease spin offs that are making good money but there isn't 
enough science coming out of UBC so there is currently a slow decline of spin off 
companies.” 
 
As seen in Figure 1, the rate of biotech start-ups over the past decade has varied widely. 
There are no obvious reasons for this time variance – from 1992 until 2001 the stock 
market’s appetite for initial placement offerings (IPOs) was insatiable.  What causes the 
flow of intellectual property from the universities (particularly UBC) to vary so greatly? 
Are the sudden changes spin offs due to market conditions, or to other factors?  It is 
probable that the decline of spin-off companies from UBC since the mid 90s can be 
attributed to: 
 
- Not enough money to support new companies (high-tech bubble burst). 
- Saturation of the market: there are too many one-product/technology companies. 
- Venture capitalists concentrating their money in already existing companies, trying to 
keep them alive. 
 
Companies spun off from university research labs appear to be a particularly effective 
means of technology transfer out of universities (Rogers, et.al, 2003).  Since 1995 SFU 
                                                
6 I am indebted to Monica Salazar for developing this analogy.  It is left to the reader to determine the 
nature of the weeds and other pests usually found in my garden! 
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and UBC have together spun off 81 companies, of which 51 (63%) are still in existence.  
Of the 81, 26 were in the bio tech area and of these 19 (73%) are still in existence 
(Clayman and Holbrook, 2003).  In this admittedly limited sample, biotech firms were a 
much larger than expected subset of the spin-offs and were more likely to succeed. 
 
The importance of these spin-offs in the cluster leads to another question – is one 
explanatory factor of the observed difference in spin-off formation between the two 
major universities – UBC and SFU?  UBC has a medical school, and SFU does not, 
which, for this sector is a major element as a driver and user of innovations.  This 
division is emphasized by the tight concentrations of UBC spin-off firms around two 
UBC locations – its main campus and the main teaching hospital.  This feature is hardly 
surprising, but what is interesting is the much wider dispersion of the (admittedly fewer) 
SFU spin-offs. But the perhaps this is due to their radically different intellectual property 
policies?  UBC retains all rights to discoveries made in its labs, granting only a non-
exclusive licence to the discoverer, while SFU gives all intellectual property rights to the 
discoverer in its labs.  In the case of SFU, the University Industry Liaison Office (UILO) 
acts only as a broker if the individual so desires. 
 
Could UILOs have done better trying to merge individual initiatives and make stronger 
companies with more than one product in the pipeline? This appears to be a disadvantage 
for the growth of the companies and the cluster7. Of course, part of the problem is that 
each scientist wants his own company8.  Possibly firms are spun off too early in the stage 
of technological development. They can have promising technology/products, but it is 
difficult to survive in the long term, needing ongoing injection of financial resources 
without producing results and revenues. 
 
As noted above, there is also the interesting question as to whether Victoria is part of 
Vancouver’s biotechnology cluster?  No matter what method of transportation is used, it 
takes over two hours to travel from one city centre to the other (other than by scheduled 
helicopter service).  Two hours is often taken as the outer boundary for travel time across 
the geographic area of a cluster.  While some argue that information technologies permit 
the creation of virtual clusters, there are those who argue that innovation is primarily a 
matter of interpersonal communication (as for example, Antonelli, 2000).  Accepting this 
argument, it is clear that electronic means of communication (even Internet video) have 
not yet reached the level of acceptance where they can replace physical meetings. 
 
What is clear is that there are many region-specific factors supporting the success of the 
biotech cluster in Vancouver.  Vancouver has world-class university research facilities, 
but no large, multinational, private sector enterprise.  This may have region-specific 
results in terms of the creation and development of start-up firms.  These firms are not 
dominated (or discouraged) by the presence of a large player in the local cluster, nor are 
they fed “scraps” of intellectual property from projects that a larger firm might not wish 
to follow up.  Vancouver has always been home to a highly entrepreneurial, risk-taking, 
financial community, originally established to exploit investment opportunities in the 
                                                
7 mentioned by several interviewees, especially consultants and venture capitalists 
8 purposely  “his”, since there almost no female entrepreneurs apart from Julia Levy of QLT 
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resources sector – mainly mining, but the resource sector has been all but taken over by 
large multinational firms. There is an observed abundance of entrepreneurial, risk-taking 
managerial and financial talent, and like the technical specialists these individuals have 
elected to transfer their entrepreneurial and intermediary skills to a new sector, rather 
than move elsewhere. Also, the chartered banks, which do play a role in generating 
capital for the industry, have S&T investment officers with independent decision-making 
authority in Vancouver, unlike other regional centres such as Halifax.  This itself may be 
an important factor, and illustrates that national innovation policy should also focus on 
the established financial services sector, rather than simply assuming that all capital 
needs will be met through independent venture capitalists. 
 
How then does the Vancouver cluster sustain itself, and remain competitive at the 
national level, if not globally?  The answer seems to lie in the nature of the outputs of the 
firms – often they never manufacture and market a product, but rather sell the intellectual 
property (including regulatory approvals and licences) to larger multinational firms for 
manufacture elsewhere.  The Vancouver entrepreneurial environment seems particularly 
favourable to the creation of firms, and it is the firms themselves (or their major assets, 
usually intellectual property) that is the final product of the cluster. 
 
By comparison, preliminary results suggest the other two large centers of bio-tech 
activity in Canada, Montreal (Quebec) and Toronto (Ontario) have quite different 
characteristics, a result predicted by Table 2.   Montreal is home to manufacturing and 
research facilities of several large multinational firms, induced, in part by the active 
promotion of Quebec as a research hub by the provincial government, through the use of 
preferential R&D tax credits. Toronto also has a large bio-tech manufacturing sector, but 
these for the most part are generic drug manufacturers, who manufacture and market 
pharmaceuticals and other bio-tech based products whose patents have expired or whose 
properties are already well known.  What all three have in common is a large, world-class 
university research community, a cosmopolitan community which provides support for 
all cultures and lifestyles and good transportation links.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study is a work in progress, which will be extended to include the characteristics of 
other clusters being studied by other investigators, both those studying the biotech sector 
in other cities in Canada and other industrial clusters in Vancouver and elsewhere.  The 
commonalities and differences noted above may be specific to this industrial sector. But 
what is clear is that these similarities and differences do have to be understood, and 
applied to other centres in Canada.  Governments, both federal and provincial, may wish 
to establish biotech clusters elsewhere in Canada, to make use of local sources of highly 
skilled labour, raw materials or manufacturing capabilities.  But simply wanting to have a 
biotech cluster establish itself, or survive in the long run without massive, ongoing 
injections of financial resources into such communities is not enough.  There are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the establishment of any industrial cluster in a 
community, and these conditions probably differ from one industrial sector to another.  
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The major policy issue that underlies this investigation is: what are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions that support the formation of a biotech cluster in Canada?  Are the 
necessary or sufficient conditions region specific?  
 
What are the necessary (common) features: university, labs, government agencies, private 
firms, human capital?  What are the sufficient conditions (conditions for continued 
existence)?  According to Porter it must include at least one private firm with a global 
reach.  We propose a new test - can the cluster survive the catastrophic loss of a 
node/actor, such as the closing or transfer of a major industrial facility.  Can a cluster 
survive without certain nodes, whether they be public sector or private sector nodes?  
 
The results suggest that innovation policy must not only focus on public investment in 
science and technology but also on issues such as venture capital financing, human 
capital development and the factors that influence the quality of life in a city9.   
 
The data to date suggest that there is indeed a viable biotech cluster in the Lower 
Mainland region of BC. There is a strong public sector institution (UBC) at the centre of 
the cluster, supported by smaller, more specialized, research institutes funded by both the 
federal and provincial governments.  There is a continuous stream of highly qualified 
researchers coming through the post-secondary education pipeline into the cluster.  There 
are a number of viable enterprises, with sufficiently diverse interests and markets that if 
one enterprise fails, the viability of the cluster is not immediately put in question10. The 
cluster is constantly evolving, changing as the technology evolves, constantly seeking 
new market niches. 
 
Unlike the classical definition of a cluster, this cluster is not based on the manufacture 
and marketing of specific, physical products, but rather on the development of intellectual 
property.  The intellectual property is often first created in one of the public sector 
institutions, before it is transferred to the private sector through the licencing of the base 
technologies to a start-up company. Indeed, one can think of the public sector as acting as 
a catalyst for the creation of spin-offs.11 These companies develop the intellectual 
property and bring it to the level where it is ready for production.  At this point the BC 
strategy is to sell its intellectual property, or the company as a whole, to an established 
biotech manufacturer (big pharma) in some other region.   
 
This process does not fit the traditional cluster model constructed by Michael Porter.  The 
Porter model has two features which narrows the scope of the concept to a large 
                                                
9 The reader should review several of the papers by Richard Florida on this subject; his results, which were 
based on research in the USA, have been replicated for Canada by Gertler et. al. and can be found at 
<<www.competeprosper.ca>> 
10 This is a feature of the horizontal nature of the cluster – the firms are not inter-dependent, and act in 
different technology/market niches. 
11 The Canadian R&D tax credit program is also a major public sector support mechanism, but it is not 
region-specific, although some provinces “sweeten” the benefits in order to try to attract R&D enterprises. 
The tax credit/cash rebate provisions of this program also set in place a significant barrier to small 
privately-controlled firms who are considering the transition to publicly traded status. 
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manufacturing-based economy with domestically-based multinational companies.  
Porter’s model defines a cluster to be a vertically-integrated agglomeration of enterprises 
that have a strong domestic market and a significant competitive advantage in the global 
market. Given that the BC economy is in a transition from a resource-based economy to a 
knowledge-based service economy, this model may be the successful model for this 
specific set of economic circumstances.   
 
“It is recognized that all user-producer (or customer-supplier) relations constituting 
inter-firms networks must, by definition, involve some degree of vertical integration. 
Therefore, horizontal is used to describe networks based on other kinds of relations –
including, for example, cooperation between rivals or informal know-how trading. This 
usage, has generated a basic distinction between ‘trade’ networks with strong vertical 
aspect and ‘knowledge’ networks with a strong horizontal aspect” (Edquist and 
Hommen, 1999: 73). 
 
In general the BC biotech sector does not manufacture commercial products – its product, 
if there is one, is intellectual property itself.  As a corollary, the cluster is not a vertically-
integrated agglomeration, but a loose horizontal association of enterprises who do not 
compete for market share.  We have found this “knowledge network” model to be a 
viable one.  Given that the BC economy is in a transition from a resource-based economy 
to a knowledge-based service economy, this model may be the successful model for this 
specific set of economic circumstances.   
 
The rise of contract research organizations (CROs) is a case in point. Canada is a good 
place for a corporation to carry out research – professional salaries are on average lower 
than in the US, and there is a favourable tax regime for corporate R&D at both the federal 
and provincial level.  The CROs have few local customers; they make use of the 
existence of the Vancouver biotech cluster to develop their capabilities and export their 
knowledge-based services.  
 
Suh (2002), in his description of emerging patterns of innovation networks in Korea 
linked the emergence of “new technology based firms”, mainly small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs), to the economic upheavals of 1997, when the traditional Korean 
economic system, founded on the chaebols was shattered.  It is tempting to link the 
emergence of a regional cluster based on SMEs to the disruption, in a Schumpeterian 
sense, of the existing economic order in a region, leading to the creation of conditions 
where radically new enterprises can flourish.  This is certainly true for BC – the severe 
contraction of the resource-based economy in BC due to depressed world commodity 
prices, trade disputes with the US, natural disasters (forest fires) and high labour wage 
rates in BC has certainly provided an economic disruption, at the regional level, 
equivalent to the Asian financial crisis of 1997.  
 
There are several high wage-rate, high educational attainment economies based on 
resource extraction.  These economies are constantly being threatened by competition 
from lower wage rate (and usually lower educational attainment) resource-based 
economies.  It is tempting to suggest that it is possible for an economy to evolve from 
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being a resource-based economy to a knowledge service-based economy without having 
to pass through the intermediate stage of being an industrialized manufacturing-based 
economy.  The BC biotech cluster offers, at least, a potential blueprint for this type of 
transition.  Study of this example may well give policymakers insight into the conditions 
that they may wish to replicate in other jurisdictions and for other industrial clusters.  
Size does matter – there are probably critical factors, below which cluster activity will 
not ignite and be self-sustaining, such as population, regional domestic product, access to 
human resources from outside the region, transportation and communications 
infrastructure.  
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Appendix “A” 
 
OECD biotechnology definition  (provisional) 
 
Summary of the Second Ad Hoc Meeting on Biotechnology Statistics  
  
The second ad hoc biotechnology statistics meeting, set up under the aegis of the 
National Experts on Science and Technology Indicators (NESTI) group, was held in Paris 
3-4 May 2001. Nineteen Member countries as well as the European Commission and 
BIAC participated: in total 35 Delegates and six members of the Secretariat.   
 
This was the second ad hoc meeting; the first was held in March of 2000. Five new 
countries were represented this year: Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Germany and Norway. Key 
issues addressed at this meeting included the establishment of a statistical definition of 
biotechnology, the presentation of a statistical compendium on existing national statistics 
and a review of alternative methodological approaches taken by countries to measure this 
activity.  
 
Main Outcome  
 
A provisional single definition and a list based definition of biotechnology were adopted. 
At the first ad hoc meeting it was agreed that both a single definition -- based on a set of 
words along the lines used in many countries-- and a list based definition -- based on a 
list of biotechnology processes/technologies-- were needed.  These two different 
definitions would be useful for statistical data collection.  
 
At the first ad hoc meeting a small working group was established to try and >reach an 
agreement on a single and a list based definition.  This group, in >conjunction with the 
Secretariat of the Working Party on Biotechnology, developed both a single and list 
based definition. Both were then circulated to the different groups for comment, revised, 
and the resulting definitions were presented at the second ad hoc meeting. Debate on this 
issue led to an agreement on the definitions of biotechnology listed below. 
 
The provisional single definition of biotechnology is as follows: 
 
"The application of S&T to living organisms as well as parts, products and models  
thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the production of  knowledge, goods 
and services."  
 
The list based definition is based on the following five categories:  
 
1.      DNA (the coding): genomics, pharmaco-genetics, gene probes, DNA 
sequencing/synthesis/amplification, genetic engineering.  
2.      Proteins and molecules (the functional blocks): protein/peptide 
sequencing/synthesis, lipid/protein engineering, proteomics, hormones, and  
growth factors, cell receptors/signalling/pheromones.  
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3.      Cell and tissue culture and engineering: cell/tissue culture, tissue engineering, 
hybridisation, cellular fusion, vaccine/immune stimulants, embryo manipulation.  
4.      Process biotechnologies: Bioreactors, fermentation, bioprocessing, bioleaching, bio-
pulping, bio-bleaching, biodesulphurization, bioremediation, and biofiltration.  
5.      Sub-cellular organisms: gene therapy, viral vectors.  
 
The initial function of the single definition was to serve as a reference for simple data 
collections.  However it is preferable to include the list based definition, or its main 
headings, in the guidelines as well, to help respondents fill in the survey and to ensure 
that the data collected are internationally comparable. 
